Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments

Francois Maniquet and Yves Sprumont ()

No 16, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.

JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2002-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 120(2), February 2005, 155-74

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Related works:
Journal Article: Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments (2005)
Working Paper: Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments (2005)
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