Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities

Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

No 30, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These conditions involve complementarity in types not only of the total payoff to a match, as in the transferable utility case, but also in the degree of transferability between partners. We apply our conditions to study some models of risk sharing and incentive problems.

Keywords: Nontransferable Utility; Assignment Games; Sorting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2003-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities (2007)
Working Paper: Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities (2004)
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