Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games

Chen Ying Huang () and Tomas Sjostrom
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Chen Ying Huang: National Taiwan University

No 52, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.

Keywords: REcursive Core; Nash Equilibrium; Partition Function Form Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 42(6) p. 771-793, 2006

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Journal Article: Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games (2006)
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