Implementation with Evidence: Complete Information

Navin Kartik and Olivier Tercieux

No 87, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: We study full-implementation in Nash equilibrium under complete information. We generalize the canonical model (Maskin, 1977) by allowing agents to send evidence or discriminatory signals. A leading case is where evidence is hard information that proves something about the state of the world. In this environment, an implementable social choice rule need not be Maskin-monotonic. We formulate a weaker property, evidence-monotonicity, and show that this is a necessary condition for implementation. Evidence-monotonicity is also sufficient for implementation if there are three or more agents and the social choice rule satisfies two other properties—no veto power and non-satiation—that are reasonable in various settings, including “economic environments”. We discuss how natural conditions on the cost of discriminatory signals yield possibility results, in contrast with traditional negative results. Additional results are provided for the case of one and two agents.

Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2009-01, Revised 2009-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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