A supervised market mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation
Alessandro Avenali (),
Tiziana D'Alfonso (),
Claudio Leporelli (),
Giorgio Matteucci (),
Alberto Nastasi () and
Pierfrancesco Reverberi ()
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Alessandro Avenali: Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
Tiziana D'Alfonso: Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
Claudio Leporelli: Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
Giorgio Matteucci: Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
Alberto Nastasi: Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
Pierfrancesco Reverberi: Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
No 2014-03, DIAG Technical Reports from Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
Abstract:
We provide a general procedure to deal with the airport slot allocation problem, which applies the principles underlying the Administered Incentive Pricing model for regulation of radio spectrum in electronic communications markets. In particular, we propose an incentive pricing mechanism that generates an efficient slot allocation, where prices are built on a measure of the best use of each slot in serving end users. Incentive prices are set by considering the structure of the air transport network (and thus interdependencies among slots at different airports) in a given region, and the effect on both quantity and quality of passenger air transport in the region. Therefore, incentive prices should better align private and social decisions over the use of slots compared with pure market mechanisms (auctions and trading).
Keywords: Airport slot allocation; Congestion; Administered incentive pricing; Market mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-reg and nep-tre
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http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/~bibdis/RePEc/aeg/report/2014-03.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aeg:report:2014-03
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