Dishonesty and Public Employment

Guillermo Cruces, Martín Rossi and Ernesto Schargrodsky

No 4401, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers from Asociación Argentina de Economía Política

Abstract: We study the link between dishonesty and selection into public employment. When military conscription was mandatory in Argentina, eligibility was determined by a lottery and by a medical examination. In order to avoid conscription, drafted individuals had strong incentives to cheat in their medical examination. These incentives varied with the lottery number. Exploiting this exogenous variation in the propensity to engage in dishonest behavior during early adulthood (the “impressionable” years), we find that individuals with higher probability of having cheated in their health checks as young adults also show higher propensity to become public employees later in life.

Keywords: Military service; conscription; public sector; state capacities; cheating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lam and nep-law
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https://aaep.org.ar/works/works2020/Rossi.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dishonesty and Public Employment (2023)
Working Paper: Dishonesty and Public Employment (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aep:anales:4401

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