Is there an economic and political cycle in social spending? Evidence from a panel of Argentine provinces for 1993-2020
María Angélica Tan Jun Ríos
No 4602, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers from Asociación Argentina de Economía Política
The Political Budget Cycles (PBC) are fundamental features of democratic regimes. Theoretical models and most of the empirical literature sustain that opportunistic incumbents manipulate fiscal policy to retain power. Using a panel data of al 24 Argentine subnational districts spanning over the lapse 1993 - 2020, I study the behavior of social spending in election and non-election years for the whole period and for different subperiods. I also explore the performance of social spending subgroups as well as partisan effects. My dynamic panel data estimations confirm that social spending increases in election years, although there are substantial differences across spending subgroups. In contrast with Calvo and Murillo (2004) I find no partisan effects in election years.
JEL-codes: D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aep:anales:4602
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