Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Kuhn Poker

Martin Loriente () and Juan Cruz Diez

No 4742, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers from Asociación Argentina de Economía Política

Abstract: In 1950, Harold W. Kuhn introduced a simplified poker variant referred to as Kuhn Poker and solved it using the notion of Nash Equilibrium. His pioneering work inspired subsequent scholars who applied similar methodologies to other poker versions. In contrast, we adopt a different procedure by employing Harsanyi’s approach to reach a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), a concept that emerged two decades after Kuhn’s original solutions. While computational techniques have advanced the analysis of various poker variations, achieving a PBE remains elusive. Some studies suffer from methodological flaws, as they overlook the importance of incorporating beliefs into their analysis. In our research, we also conducted a rationality study and found that relaxing the sophistication of a player leads to a shift in optimal strategies towards more exploitative ones.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Kuhn Poker (2023)
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