Excuses and Redistribution

Bea Ahumada

No 4776, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers from Asociación Argentina de Economía Política

Abstract: This study explores how, when income inequality is perceived to arise from both effort and luck, excuses (self-serving belief distortions) can influence acceptance of inequality. In a controlled laboratory setting involving a real-effort task, participants make redistribution decisions between themselves and a partner. The study varied the degree of uncertainty about the role of effort and luck in determining initial earnings endowments. Belief elicitations indicate that increased uncertainty caused participants to be more likely to attribute their partner's success to luck. Furthermore, the use of excuses (attributing others' outcomes to luck) was found to reduce willingness to redistribute earnings to their partners. These findings highlight how excuses about the role of luck versus effort may contribute to the persistence of inequality even if many individuals have meritocratic principles, and how variation in the degree of uncertainty about the causes of inequality, across individuals or societies, may contribute to different degrees of biased beliefs and inequality. The paper also shows evidence of excuses in another sense: According to a structural model of fairness views, individuals tend to adopt a fairness view -- egalitarian, meritocratic, or libertarian -- to justify an allocation that benefits themselves.

JEL-codes: C9 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2025-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aep:anales:4776

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