In the Light of Dynamic Competition: Should We Make Merger Remedies More Flexible?

Patrice Bougette, Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty

No 23-01, Working Papers AFED from Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED)

Abstract: Mergers and acquisitions shape industry competition. Effective merger remedies are important for market efficiency and consumer welfare. This paper explores the need for more flexible remedies to address changing markets after mergers. While the EU permits some flexibility with less restrictive remedies, we conceptually advance the design elements of a dual-phase, bifurcated merger control system. This system integrates ex-ante processes with more systematic and comprehensive ex-post measures. Such an approach can address the shortcomings of the current system and, consequently, holds the potential to enhance merger control in dynamic markets.

Keywords: merger remedies; competition authorities; market dynamics; dynamic competition; oligopolies; innovation effects; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: In the Light of Dynamic Competition: Should We Make Merger Remedies More Flexible? (2024)
Working Paper: In The Light Of Dynamic Competition: Should We Make Merger Remedies More Flexible? (2023)
Working Paper: In the light of dynamic competition: Should we make merger remedies more flexible? (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:afd:wpaper:2301

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