Trust in the Fight Against Political Corruption: A Survey Experiment among Citizens and Experts

Benjamin Monnery and Alexandre Chirat
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Alexandre Chirat: EconomiX (UMR 7235), UPL, Université Paris Nanterre, CNRS, 200 avenue de la République, 92001 Nanterre cedex, France

No 24-02, Working Papers AFED from Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED)

Abstract: Western democracies experienced in recent decades a transformation of the relationship between citizens and their representatives towards greater accountability and transparency. These demands led to the emergence of new regulations and anti-corruption institutions. However, it often remains unknown whether such institutions are able to secure public trust and legitimacy in order to fulfill their mission effectively. The paper investigates this question by focusing on France, which quickly became a leader in the fight against corruption after the launch in 2013 of the High Authority for the Transparency in Public Life (HATVP). We run a survey experiment among 3,000 citizens and 33 experts to collect their prior beliefs about political corruption, and then evaluate the impact of granting basic information on citizens’ perceptions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the French anti-corruption agency. First, results show a large divide between the average citizen and the more optimistic experts about the dynamics of political integrity. Second, citizens have heterogeneous beliefs and those most distrustful are not only more likely to vote for populist candidates or abstain but are also the least informed about the anti-corruption agency. Third, the information provision experiment has meaningful and positive impacts on citizens’ perceptions of the HATVP, political transparency, and representative democracy. The beneficial effects are as large or even larger among the most distrustful and ill-informed citizens, and can close part of the gap with the assessments made by experts.

Keywords: Political corruption; Political trust; Anti-corruption agency; Integrity; Populism; survey experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C99 D72 M48 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-inv and nep-pol
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