Judicial Venality: A Rational Choice Analysis

Bertrand Crettez, Bruno Deffains, Olivier Musy and Ronan Tallec
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Bertrand Crettez: Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, CRED, EA 7321 - 75005 Paris.
Bruno Deffains: Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, CRED, EA 7321 - 75005 Paris.
Ronan Tallec: Université Paris Cité, LIRAES, F-75006 Paris, France.

No 24-05, Working Papers AFED from Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED)

Abstract: Venality, i.e., the sale of public positions, was widely used in the judicial sector in France between the 16th and 18th centuries. In a venal system, litigants finance the justice system by paying the judges directly. In France, moreover, the right to judge was sold by the ruler, who indirectly levied part of the legal costs. Here, instead of the state funding justice, justice funds the state. The cost to the King was a loss of control over the judiciary and biased legal decisions. We develop a model of judicial venality and build on this model to provide an analytical narrative of the rise and decline of judicial venality in Old Regime France. Historically, judicial venality enhanced legal capacity whereas the kings faced with limited opportunities to raise taxes and to borrow. Lack of control over the judiciary, however, led to overly costly and time-consuming trials, resulting in its final demise.

Keywords: Law and Economics; Judicial Venality; Private Justice; Institutional and Legal Design; Economic Analysis of the History of Law; French Old Regime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 K0 K40 K41 N40 N43 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-law
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