Tenancy and Soil Conservation in Market Equilibrium

Erik Lichtenberg

No 20489, 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: A theoretical analysis of equilibrium contracts between risk neutral landlords and tenants when tenants' soil exploitation is non-contractible indicates that landlords will overinvest in conservation structures. An empirical model using farm-level data provides evidence that investment in contractible soil conservation measures is greater on rental land.

Keywords: Land; Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea01:20489

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20489

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