MECHANISM DESIGN FOR NUTRIENT TRADING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Robert Johansson ()

No 20558, 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to evaluate first- and second-best trading mechanisms for regulating point and nonpoint source phosphorus emissions. The trading mechanisms are differentiated on the degree to which regulators can observe abatement efforts. The deadweight losses attributable to informational asymmetries and those of the second-best mechanisms will provide regulators the shadow value of foregoing first-best measures.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea01:20558

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20558

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