AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE: THE CASE OF SKIPJACK FISHERY IN THE WESTERN-CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN

Toyokazu Naito

No 20675, 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: A dynamic Cournot game model is used to predict the strategic behavior of harvesters engaged in a non-cooperative fishery on a common property resource. The model predicts that an increase in the current number of harvesters in a common property fishery will reduce both the equilibrium harvest level and the current resource rent for the individual harvester. Also, an increase in the future number of harvesters increases both two equilibrium levels. These predictions are tested using data from the Japanese skipjack fishery in the Western-central Pacific Ocean. The empirical results on the effect of changes in the current and future numbers of harvesters on the individual harvest rates and resource rent are consistent with theory.

Keywords: Resource/Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea01:20675

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20675

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