Comparing Policy Instruments in a Dynamic Environment with Strategic Firms: The Case of Minnesota Phosphorus Emissions

Amyaz Moledina

No 20751, 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper examines the strategic behavior of firms under emissions taxes and tradable emissions permits designed to mitigate phosphorus emissions. The Nash payoff to the regulator of the strategic game is determined for a sub-basin of the Minnesota River using econometric estimates of cost and benefit functions representative of the region. These payoffs are compared to determine the preferred policy instrument. Results show that emission permits yield lower deadweight losses than emissions taxes.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea01:20751

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20751

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