A PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH TO THE DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY

Jonathan Alevy ()

No 20764, 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper applies a multi-tasking model of moral hazard to study the delegation of regulatory authority for health and environmental risks. The model characterizes the conditions under which single and multiple bureaucratic agencies are optimal, and relates these findings to discussions of appropriate regulation of agricultural biotechnology

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea01:20764

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20764

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