POINT-NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION TRADING USING COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Michael A. Taylor, Alan Randall and Brent Sohngen

No 20776, 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Point-nonpoint trading markets must accommodate the problem of monitoring individual nonpoint source discharges (NPS). A permit trading market that allows the regulator to monitor noncompliance based on observable aggregate NPS pollution levels, through the use of a collective enforcement mechanism, may be more efficient than traditional technology-based trading.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea01:20776

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20776

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