CONSERVATION COMPLIANCE ON HIGHLY ERODIBLE LAND: AN EMPIRICAL AUDITING GAME

Konstantinos Giannakas (kgiannakas@unl.edu) and Jonathan D. Kaplan

No 19607, 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: We estimate a sequential game between farmers and government auditors to determine the effectiveness of the current enforcement policy in deterring noncompliance with the conservation program on highly erodible land. The empirical results indicate that using farm program payments as leverage against noncompliance is insufficient for inducing full producer compliance.

Keywords: Land; Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea02:19607

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19607

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