PRESCRIBED FIRE: LIABILITY, REGULATION, AND ENDOGENOUS RISK

Jonathan Yoder ()

No 19675, 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper compares the incentive effects of strict liability and negligence rules when timing of activity affects environmental risk. The model is developed in the context of prescribed fire as a land management input, with an extension to the related problem of wildfire risk mitigation through vegetation management. The use of prescribed fire for land management and wildfire risk control is increasing in parts of the United States, and related liability and regulatory law is changing with it.

Keywords: Resource/Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea02:19675

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19675

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