TESTING PROTECTION FOR SALE IN THE FOOD INDUSTRIES

Rigoberto Lopez and Ibrahima Hathie

No 19682, 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper tests the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale model using panel data from U.S. food processing industries with endogenous protection, import penetration, and political campaign. The results support the key predictions of the model: organized industries are granted higher protection that decreases with import penetration and the price elasticity of imports. Furthermore, the presence of import quotas raises the level of protection substantially. The estimated weight on aggregate welfare is strikingly similar those found by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandopadhyay (2000), implying that protection is not for sale in these industries.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea02:19682

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19682

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