VOLUNTARY POLLUTION ABATEMENT: TESTING ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

Robert Innes () and Abdoul G. Sam

No 21945, 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: We broaden the existing empirical literature on environmental regulation and voluntary pollution abatement programs by testing the effects of implicit boycott threats and a firm's participation in a partnership program on its subsequent regulatory oversight using EPA's 33/50 program as a research experiment. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis of a preemptive self-selection to deter consumer boycotts. The findings also indicate that (1) predetermined corrective actions constitute a significant determinant of voluntary participation and (2) EPA reciprocated to voluntary participation by easing regulatory oversight on participants.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea03:21945

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21945

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