A COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTRACT FOR POINT-NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION TRADING

Michael A. Taylor, Alan Randall and Brent Sohngen

No 22069, 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Collective performance-based trading can be achieved by pairing a team contract with an auction to determine team membership. The auction effectively overcomes adverse selection, and the team contract reduces the incentive to "free-ride" associated with moral hazard in teams.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea03:22069

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.22069

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