MORAL HAZARD AND BT CORN REFUGE

Paul Mitchell (pdmitchell@wisc.edu) and Zhu, En (John)

No 22113, 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Using a principal-agent model, we find the optimal subsidy contract that induces grower compliance with Bt corn refuge requirements for managing insect resistance when asymmetric information exists concerning grower behavior. The optimal contract balances the cost of monitoring and the benefit of reducing the likelihood of insect resistance.

Keywords: Crop; Production/Industries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea03:22113

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.22113

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