REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Anasuya Chattopadhyay and
Theodore Horbulyk ()
No 22121, 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)
Game theory and numerical simulation are used to analyze government's role in regulating IPRs for agricultural biotechnology in a developing country. An imported variety brings productivity gains and a negative externality. The relative effectiveness of corrective taxes or subsidies depends upon whether there is full enforcement of the IPRs.
Keywords: Research; and; Development/Tech; Change/Emerging; Technologies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea03:22121
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