BUNDLING AND LICENSING OF GENES IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
No 19913, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)
This paper examines the strategic incentive for gene holders to vertically integrate with seed companies, and with herbicide/insecticide oligopolies, given the unique institutional structure and relevant market in agricultural biotechnology. We model the case with homogeneous basic seeds, and investigate both pre-entry and post-entry equilibrium.
Keywords: Research; and; Development/Tech; Change/Emerging; Technologies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea04:19913
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