COUNTERVAILING DUTIES, ANTIDUMPING TARIFFS, AND THE BYRD AMENDMENT: A WELFARE ANALYSIS
Troy G. Schmitz and
James Seale ()
No 19980, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)
The so-called "Byrd Amendment" effectively empowers producers and processors, who successfully petition the U.S. government to impose ADCV duties on competing imports, to keep the proceeds of those tariffs. We determine the effect that the Amendment has on domestic producers, consumers, and taxpayers. We derive the "optimum antidumping tariff" that would maximize the welfare of producers that receive payments under the Amendment. We compare and contrast this newly derived optimal antidumping tariff (that maximizes the sum of producer surplus and tariff revenue) with the optimal revenue tariff (that maximizes tariff revenue alone) and the optimal welfare tariff (that maximizes the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tariff revenue).
Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Countervailing Duties, Antidumping Tariffs, and the Byrd Amendment: A Welfare Analysis (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea04:19980
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