FORWARD CONTRACTING SPECIFICATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Ming-Chin Chin and Robert Weaver

No 20006, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Game-based bargaining theory is presented to evaluate the potential of and stability of cooperative coalition among producers for enhancing producer returns and managing market price and income risk. Results clarify that collective bargaining can increase and stabilize producer profits when they face a single processor.

Keywords: Research; Methods/; Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea04:20006

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20006

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