ADVERSE SELECTION, MORAL HAZARD, AND GROWER COMPLIANCE WITH BT CORN REFUGE

Paul Mitchell (), Zhu, En (John) and Terrance Hurley

No 20123, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper develops a principal-agent model of farmer compliance with Bt corn refuge requirements intended to manage the evolution of resistance to the Bt toxin by insect pests. The model endogenizes the price of the technology, the audit rate, and the fine imposed on non-complying farmers when farmer willingness to pay for Bt corn and compliance effort is private information.

Keywords: Crop; Production/Industries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Chapter: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Grower Compliance with Bt Corn Refuge (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea04:20123

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20123

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