 IMPORT SAFEGUARDS: PROTECTIONIST MEASURES OR A LIBERALIZATION STRATEGY?Jason Grant () and Karl Meilke No 20236, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) Abstract: The Doha Trade Round maintains that a considerable effort will be given to take into account better the particular needs of developing nations. Many low-income countries argue that the flexibility to invoke a special safeguard mechanism when faced with volatile commodity markets is a necessary condition for further market access reform. The implications of a safeguard for developing agriculture as a trade-off for lowering their tariff rates, is an important empirical question. Two stochastic simulation experiments are developed using wheat as a case study to estimate the marginal effects of a safeguard in terms of domestic market stability and on developed exporting nations. The results reveal that a safeguard for developing agriculture is minimally trade distorting and in general, costs less than one percent of total world welfare that would be realized if low-income countries were not granted a safeguard. Furthermore, safeguards are an attractive policy tool because they are transparent, easy to use and are an automatic mechanism. Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea04:20236 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) Contact information at EDIRC. |
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