FIRMS, INCENTIVES, AND THE SUPPLY OF FOOD SAFETY: A FORMAL MODEL OF GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
Peter Goldsmith (),
Nesve A. Turan and
Hamish R. Gow
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Neşve A. Turan Brewster
No 20343, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)
Recent instances of significant food safety breeches in both meat and biotechnology challenge traditional safety efforts. A formal model utilizing agency theory is used to explore the power relationships between the regulator and the firm. Fundamental issues effecting firms' supply of safety are demonstrated and alternative corrective mechanisms are discussed.
Keywords: Food; Consumption/Nutrition/Food; Safety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea04:20343
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