Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages

Maoyong Fan (), Myoungki Lee and Steven Wu ()

No 20392, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Using a dynamic principal-agent model, we analyze termination damages that protect growers from contract termination or non-renewal. We show that government imposed breach damages can be distortionary and may not necessarily lead to increased grower welfare.

Keywords: Crop; Production/Industries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2004
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Journal Article: Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea04:20392

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20392

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