Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages
Maoyong Fan (),
Myoungki Lee and
Steven Wu ()
No 20392, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)
Using a dynamic principal-agent model, we analyze termination damages that protect growers from contract termination or non-renewal. We show that government imposed breach damages can be distortionary and may not necessarily lead to increased grower welfare.
Keywords: Crop; Production/Industries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea04:20392
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