A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response

Benjamin Gramig, Richard Horan and Christopher Wolf ()

No 19200, 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By incorporating the asymmetry, we investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and magnitude of a disease epidemic.

Keywords: Institutional; and; Behavioral; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea05:19200

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19200

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