Managerial Incentives, Moral Hazard, and Structural Change in Agricultural Cooperatives

Kimberly A. Zeuli and Jeremy Foltz

No 19226, 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: The federated business structure exists in many sectors of the economy, but we know little about its comparative advantage. This paper explores theoretically and empirically the current dynamics of the federated cooperative system. Two hypotheses are tested: growth at the local co-op level has made the structure redundant and managerial incentives create disloyalty. We use a unique data set from a survey of local farm supply and grain marketing cooperatives in the Midwest.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19226/files/sp05ze01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea05:19226

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19226

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().