Reducing Deer Overabundance by Distinguishing High-productivity Hunters: Revealed-Preference, Incentive-Compatible Licensing Mechanisms

Kelly John Ward

No 19281, 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper models the current problem of overabundance (and under-harvesting) of white-tailed deer as a Principal-Agent problem, with adverse selection and moral hazard. Using econometric analysis of data available from hunter behaviors studies in Pennsylvania, overall welfare gains are estimated from increased hunter satisfaction and license revenue. Results indicate that significant gains in economic surplus result when licensing schemes are unrestricted by current quota systems.

Keywords: Resource/Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea05:19281

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19281

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