Should We Expect Government Policy to Be Pareto Efficient?: The Consequences of an Arrow-Debreu Economy with Violable Property Rights

David Bullock (dsbulloc@illinois.edu)

No 19444, 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: To address the question, "Should we expect government policy to be efficient?" at its roots, I modify the well-known Arrow-Debreu private ownership economy, allowing property rights to be violable. The result is that equilibria tend to be Pareto inefficient.

Keywords: Research; Methods/Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea05:19444

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19444

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