Schemes to Regulate Non-Point Water Pollution: Making Sense of Experimental Results

Helen Pushkarskaya (helen.pushkarskaya@yale.edu)

No 21111, 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Three theoretical non-point water pollution (NPS) control schemes were tested repeatedly in experimental studies tax-subsidy scheme (K. Segerson, 1988), collective fining (Xepapadeas, 1991) and random fining (Xepapadeas, 1991). Camacho and Requate (2004) summarized results reported by Spraggon (2002), Vossler et al (2002), Cochard et al (2002), and Alpizar et al (2004) and replicated their experiments. This paper discusses similarity and differences among all the reported results and in particular the following two. First, both collective fining and random fining induce abatement under the target, their performance deteriorates over time and is relatively consistent over the replications. Second, tax-subsidy scheme induced abatement over the target, its performance is consistent over periods, but not over the replications.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21111/files/sp06pu01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Schemes to Regulate Non-Point Water Pollution: Making Sense of Experimental Results (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea06:21111

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21111

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search (aesearch@umn.edu).