Traceability, Liability and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality

Sebastien Pouliot () and Daniel Sumner

No 21121, 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: In this paper we focus specifically on the implications for additional traceability in the context of liability for food safety problems. We model formally the linkage between traceability and food safety and establish the implications of an increase in traceability-liability for food safety and related economic outcomes. The capacity to trace the origin of food increases the possibility of legal remedy and compensation in case of food safety event. Traceability also allows parties to more easily document that they are not responsible for harm. Therefore, traceability systems create incentives for firms to supply safer food.

Keywords: Food; Consumption/Nutrition/Food; Safety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21121/files/sp06su08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality (2010)
Journal Article: Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea06:21121

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21121

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