Cooperative Growth and Decline: A Game Theoretic Approach to Understanding Members' Allocation Choices

Jennifer Keeling Bond

No 21279, 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: In the present research, the agent's choice to leave or join a cooperative is modeled to be a function of alternative investment opportunities and choices made by other agents who are faced with an identical set of possible strategies. Once the agent has made the decision to join a cooperative, the agent may reevaluate available alternatives in each period. The result is a multi-period repeated game in which the growth or decline of a cooperative is determined.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea06:21279

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21279

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