Carbon Trading and No-Permanency of Agricultural Sequestration: Institutional Design and the Choice of Working Rules

Paul J. Thomassin

No 21364, 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: The institutional development of a domestic carbon trading institution in Canada that includes carbon off-sets must address the problems of providing the appropriate incentives to generate carbon reductions and removals and the problem of non-permanency of sequestered carbon. The paper analyzes two rule sets to address these problems and estimates the economic impact of these sets.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea06:21364

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21364

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