Market Value Maximization through Strategic Delegation

Shinn-Shyr Wang and Kyle Stiegert ()

No 9754, 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a model of strategic delegation in which shareholders maintain an objective of market value maximization (MVM) of the firm's assets as measured by a capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Optimal delegation requires that managers maximize a linear combination of expected profits and firm values. An interesting feature of this model is that optimal delegation contracts of the MVM objective mitigate competition relative to standard price and quantity duopoly outcomes. In the MVM model, the delegation encourages managers to control systematic risk, which leads to greater market coordination, higher profits, and higher stock values. Impacts of degree of product differentiation on delegation under price and quantity competitions are also explored extensively. Our findings show that concerns about identifying the mode of competition are overstated in the literature.

Keywords: Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/9754/files/sp07wa03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea07:9754

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.9754

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().