Slotting Allowances and Retail Product Variety under Oligopoly

Robert Innes () and Stephen Hamilton

No 60948, 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Abstract: Slotting fees are fixed charges paid by food manufacturers to retailers for access to the retail market. The role of the practice and its effects on market efficiency are highly controversial. To date, the literature has focused on the effect of the practice on retail prices; however, slotting allowances also have the potential to alter the range of products available to consumers. Our analysis reveals that the strategic use of slotting allowances by oligopoly firms leads to a superior allocation of product variety among retailers. Indeed, absent price effects, we show that slotting allowances lead to the socially optimal provision of product variety.

Keywords: Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Industrial Organization; Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2010
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/60948/files/slotting.variety_aaea.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Slotting allowances and retail product variety under oligopoly (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea10:60948

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.60948

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().