Imperfect Information and the Reserve Price Dynamics In Auctions

Jafar Olimov

No 103386, 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Abstract: I study a hybrid bargaining model with an English auction in each state. The seller uses auctions to extract information about the bidders’ values of the object on sale. The bargaining element is introduced to maximize revenue, since the winning bidder has to exceed not only the second-highest bid but also the reservation price of the seller. This model can explain the following empirical facts from Ebay auctions: multiple relisting of similar items, the use of secret reserve prices, and the convergence of sale

Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 2
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/103386/files/A ... %20Poster%202011.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea11:103386

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.103386

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search (aesearch@umn.edu).