ASSESSING A PROVISION GAME FOR TWO UNITS OF A PUBLIC GOOD, WITH DIFFERENT GROUP ARRANGEMENTS, MARGINAL BENEFITS, AND REBATE RULES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Pengfei Liu, Stephen Swallow () and Christopher M. Anderson

No 123205, 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Abstract: We design two institutions that collect individual contributions to provide multiple public good units, inspired by a problem to deliver ecosystem services as a step-level public good (delivered in discrete increments). We set up a public good experiment wherein either all individuals for one group and are responsible for providing the two units (aggregated-group approach), or two groups provide one unit separately, but both group benefits if any unit is provided (disaggregated-group approach). Our interest is to test which of these two institutions performs “better” through the collective decision process. Our results show that, in general, the aggregated-group has a higher rate of success delivering at least one unit of the public good, while the disaggregated-group institution generates more revenue. Furthermore, we explore the influence of different rebate rules that redistribute the portion of contributions, that exceeds the provision cost, under both institutions. We find rebate rules significantly raise individual contributions, even though they do not change the set of requirements for Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123205/files/aaeapublicgood.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Assessing a Provision Game for Two Units of a Public Good, With Different Group Arrangements, Marginal Benefits, and Rebate Rules: Experimental Evidence (2011)
Working Paper: Assessing a Provision Game for Two Units of a Public Good, With Different Group Arrangements, Marginal Benefits, and Rebate Rules: Experimental Evidence (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea12:123205

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.123205

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