A Political-Economy Analysis of a GMO Trade Agreement

Qianqian Shao, Maarten Punt and Justus Wesseler

No 170047, 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Abstract: The EU and the US launched negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in July 2013. Among the TTIP aims, there are negotiable terms under which the EU would import more genetically modified (GM) products and change its labeling regulations on GM Organisms (GMOs). This paper discusses a trade agreement of agricultural products between two countries, with different GM regulatory regimes from a political economy perspective. We find the negotiation equilibrium of the GMO Trade Agreement and compare it with a stricter trade policy. We find that if the trade agreement leads to a lenient GM regulation, lobbying intensifies. However, this effect is moderated if there are exports of non-GM products.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-int and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea14:170047

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.170047

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