How does the revelation of previous bid affect new bid?

Yingzi Li, R. Karina Gallardo (), Vicki McCracken, Chengyan Yue, James Luby and James R. McFerson

No 170439, 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Abstract: This study investigates the effect of the revelation of posted bids in second-price experimental auctions for apple quality attributes under the experimental design where information is added progressively across rounds. We find that the revelation of posted bids does not bias the following bids and that increased information about the apple increases the accuracy of participants’ following bids. Therefore, the final round bids are used to evaluate consumers’ willingness to pay for the apple attributes of interest in this study. Consumers are found to prefer large, firm, sweet, crisp and less defects coverage apples.

Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis; Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mkt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea14:170439

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.170439

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