The Potential for Moral Hazard Behavior in Irrigation Decisions under Crop Insurance

Paloch Suchato, Taro Mieno (), Karina Schoengold and Timothy Foster

No 291090, 2019 Annual Meeting, July 21-23, Atlanta, Georgia from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Keywords: Resource/Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-ias
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Journal Article: The potential for moral hazard behavior in irrigation decisions under crop insurance (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea19:291090

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.291090

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