INTERNATIONAL TRADE, CARTELS, CUSTOMS UNIONS AND CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES

Robert G. Chambers

No 278298, 1979 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, Pullman, Washington from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: A simple 2 x 2 model of international trade is used to demonstrate that an international cartel or customs unions, with monopoly power in trade, may prefer autarky to tariff protected trade if a distortionary wage differential exists. Com— parative static results are also investigated.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 1979-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea79:278298

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.278298

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