MOTIVES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LICENSING OF BRANDED FOOD AND RELATED PRODUCTS
Ian M. Sheldon and
Dennis R. Henderson
No 270873, 1990 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Vancouver, Canada from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)
Given initial empirical observations of international licensing of food and beer brands, this paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of the motives for licensing. In a situation of complete information, the model suggests that imperfect competition in overseas markets may be an important determinant of a branded product licensing equilibrium, whilst incomplete information about incumbent firms' payoffs and strategies and also repetition of the game may generate a sequence of unsuccessful entry followed by licensing.
Keywords: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea90:270873
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