THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TARIFFS IN U.S. FOOD MANUFACTURING

Emilio Pagoulatos and Rigoberto Lopez

No 271068, 1991 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Manhattan, Kansas from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper estimates a simple model of tariff formation for U.S. food manufacturing industries based on a political market for protection. Findings indicate that higher tariffs tend to be associated with declining, low-skill, and labor-intensive industries, who actively lobby by supporting particular congressional candidates in elections.

Keywords: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 1991-08-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea91:271068

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271068

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